The Taft-Katsura Agreement (Japanese: 桂・タフト協定, Hepburn: Katsura-Tafuto Kyōtei, also known as the Taft Katsura Memorandum), was a 1905 discussion between the leaders of Japan and the United States about the position of the two nations in East Asian affairs, particularly with regard to the status of Korea and the Philippines after Japan`s victory in the Russo-Japanese War. The memorandum was not classified as secret, but no scholar noticed it in the archives until 1924. President Roosevelt accepted Taft`s understanding in a telegram dated July 31, 1905. “Your conversation with Count Katsura is quite correct in every respect. I would like you to tell Katsura that I confirm all the words you have spoken. Although Taft Katsura acknowledged that no agreement could be binding on the United States without the consent of the Senate, Roosevelt never informed the Senate or Congress, broadly speaking, of what Taft and Katsura had been talking about. (Roosevelt`s attitude toward the Senate on these issues was best summed up by his response three years later, when asked whether to inform the Senate of another secret agreement he had negotiated with Japan: “Why invite the expression of views with which we might disagree?”) Taft-Katsura`s memorandum was also not discussed in the press. For nearly two decades, it remained unknown and forgotten. In August 1924, Tyler Dennett, a professor of history at Johns Hopkins University, revealed its existence. He had tripped over it while going around Roosevelt`s papers at the Library of Congress. He asked Foreign Minister Charles Evans Hughes if he could publish the document. The document had never been classified, so Hughes said yes. The memorandum was later published in Current History titled “President Roosevelt`s Secret Pact with Japan.” Moreover, not only did the Americans not “do their good offices,” but they refused to abide by the 1882 peace treaty by not offering to reach an amicable settlement with Chosun`s claims that the protectorate treaty for Korean Japan was “signed under duress.”.
as King Kojong said. Instead, America was washing its hands of the “Korean problem” in exchange for carte blanche for U.S. interests in the Philippines. The result of the discussion was that Roosevelt had signaled that he would not oppose Japanese plans for Korea. This fact would be codified in the Treaty of Portsmouth, which recognized the legitimacy of Japanese claims to Korea and southern Manchuria. When, in November 1905, Korea cited its 1882 Treaty of Friendship with the United States for diplomatic assistance in dealing with Japanese pressure, Roosevelt refused. By mid-November, Japan had taken control of Korea`s foreign policy. Two weeks later, the United States concluded its embassies in Korea and placed “Korea” under the title “Japan” in the State Department`s Record of Foreign Relations. The conversation then shifted to the situation in East Asia. Katsura said the only way to keep the peace in the region was to “make a good understanding between the three governments of Japan, the United States and Britain.” Mr.
Taft replied that President Roosevelt could not conclude such an agreement without the agreement of the US Senate. However, the minister of war said that Korean historians assumed that the United States, in the discussions, recognized Japan`s sphere of influence in Korea; In exchange, Japan recognized the U.S. sphere of influence in the Philippines. American historians who review official recordings, but report that no agreement was ever reached – the two men discussed current events, but did not reach a new policy or agreement. Both reaffirmed the well-known official policy of their own governments. In fact, Taft was very careful to indicate this as his private views, and he was not an official representative of the US administration (Taft was Secretary of War, not Foreign Secretary).   In the absence of any agreement, the people of the United States were so fully in agreement with the policy of Japan and Great Britain in maintaining peace in the Far East that they could count, on whatever occasion, on appropriate action by the United States government, in liaison with Japan and Great Britain, to this end, as if the United States were under contract. Obligations to take [he]. . .